ory is that of Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Yugoslav republic of Serbia. But it’s a scenario that Boris Yeltsin of Russia would be well advised to heed. In Yugoslavia, communism began to crumble when the federation’s leader, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, died in 1980; it was wiped away from parts of the country when the electorates of Slovenia and Croatia voted new non-communist parties into power last year. As the Communists’ grip has weakened over the past decade, ethnic rivalries have intensified-finally leading to civil war more than two months ago. Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence. A truce imposed since July 8 has brought relative peace to Slovenia. But in Croatia, Croat nationalists and Serb rebels–apparently backed by the federal Army-have ignored a cease-fire technically in force since Aug. 7. This is the same specter that must haunt the Soviet Union today, where economic and ethnic rivalries could break out into violence between the republics–or within them. “Minorities are going to be an acid test for all post-communist societies,” says Yugoslav political scientist Simon Petrovic. “With communism all but disappearing, tribal instincts are coming back.”
Last week the Serbs and Croats who inhabit the Croatian-held town of Vukovar demonstrated just how destructive such instincts can be. Clashes in that area claimed at least 40 lives, raising the Yugoslav death toll to more than 300 since June. Exactly what happened at Vukovar depends on whom you ask. According to Croat accounts, fighting was provoked when the Yugoslav Army launched a tank attack on the town’s Croats. The Serbs maintain that the Croatian National Guard opened fire on the federal Army units first.
Officially, the Yugoslav Army is supposed to be under the command of what’s left of the Yugoslav collective presidency, currently chaired by a Croat, Stipe Mesic. In theory, it can intervene only to keep Serb and Croat troops apart. But Mesic now complains that the Yugoslav Army whose officer corps is dominated by ethnic Serbs, is " out of control," has stopped taking his orders and is siding openly with the Serbs. For a long time the Army provided at least a semblance of national cement; it seemed to be the last institution that stood for the feasibility of a post-Tito Yugoslavia. Now, says a Western diplomat in Belgrade, “it is reacting like a Serb army in open alliance with Serb irregulars.” The Yugoslav Army’s transformation poses a troubling analogy for Russia: now that the Kremlin has lost so much of its authority, will the Soviet Army become an instrument of Russian national aspirations? “In the wake of the Yugoslav example, nobody can prediet how the [Soviet] armed forces will go,” says Yugoslav political scientist Costa Cavoski. “What will Soviet tank officers do when it comes to Russians versus Latvians or Ukrainians versus Moldavians?”
There could be at least one redeeming feature of the Yugoslav crisis: it may spur Western nations–and, in particular, the European Community–to define their role in armed European confrontations. If the West manages to promote a settlement, perhaps it will be better prepared to confront problems of a potentially more devastating scale in the Soviet Union. “We must prevent this war, which at this point is a limited war, from becoming larger,” Croatian President Franjo Tudjman warned after meeting with France’s Francois Mitterrand last week. The Serbo-Croat struggle could easily spill over into a broader regional conflict. Ethnic Albanians in the southern region of Kosovo could demand reunification with Albania, especially if that country achieves a transition to democracy. If Yugoslavia falls apart, Greece, a NATO member, and Bulgaria, which is still close to Moscow, may renew their rival claims to the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia. There are many ethnic Hungarians in the Yugoslav region of Vojvodina, which could tempt Budapest to make a bid for territorial adjustments. Some believe even neutral Austria could become drawn into the conflict. “Conservatives in Austria have some dreams of re-creating the old Hapsburg state,” says Milovan Djilas, a dissident under Tito and now a semi-retired political thinker.
The West European nations’ efforts to mediate have been undercut by their own divergent interests and sympathies. Germany and Austria strongly favor recognizing Croatian and Slovenian independence. Italy fears that nationhood for the two breakaway republics might boost separatist aspirations within its own German-speaking minority, but Rome is likely to agree to anything that would keep Yugoslav refugees from flooding into Italy. Spain wants to preserve a central government in Belgrade. Until recently France did, too; but after his meeting with Tudjman, Mitterrand is believed to have changed his mind. Last week he proposed a tough new peace plan whose specifies clearly placed the onus for the conflict on the Serbs. Cynics quickly pointed out that the Mitterrand plan is one in a series of peace initiatives advanced by various European bodies since June 25-all of which have failed. Still, the disintegration of Soviet central power may force the West to address the Yugoslav crisis with a fresh sense of urgency. If a solution cannot be found, and if the Soviet Union continues to drift into its own form of anarchy, Europe could be in the most volatile condition it has experienced since the end of World War II.
